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Abstract This paper presents a new incentive compatible method for measuring
confidence in own knowledge. This method consists of two parts. First, an
individual answers several general knowledge questions. Second, the individual
chooses among three alternatives: (1) one question is selected at random and the
individual receives a payoff if he or she has answered this question correctly; (2) the
individual receives the same payoff with a probability equal to the percentage of
correctly answered questions; (3) either the first or the second alternative is selected.
The choice of the first (second) alternative reveals overconfidence (underconfi-
dence). The individual is well calibrated if he or she chooses the third alternative.
Experimental results show that subjects, on average, exhibit underconfidence about
their own knowledge when the incentive compatible mechanism is used. Their
confidence in own knowledge does not depend on their attitude towards risk/
ambiguity.
Keywords Overconfidence . Underconfidence . Lottery . Experiment . Risk aversion
JEL C91 . D81
This paper investigates whether people think that they know more than they actually
do. There is a substantial literature in psychology which suggests that people are
apparently overconfident about own knowledge (e.g. Keren 1991; Yates 1990). In a
typical experiment, subjects answer several binary-choice general knowledge
questions. For each question, subjects have to choose which of the two suggested
answers is correct in their opinion. Subjects are also asked to indicate their
confidence on a 50–100% scale that their answer was correct. Individual responses
are then sorted by the revealed confidence level and the percentage of correct
J Risk Uncertain (2009) 38:39–49
DOI 10.1007/s11166-008-9048-7
P. R. Blavatskyy (*)
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Winterthurerstrasse 30,
CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland
e-mail: pavlo.blavatskyy@iew.uzh.ch
answers in each confidence category is calculated. Subjects are classified as
overconfident if their stated confidence judgments are greater than the corresponding
percentage of correctly answered questions.
Subjects are rarely overconfident in every confidence category. A typical finding
is that subjects appear overconfident for difficult questions (percentage of correct
answers below approximately 75%) and underconfident or well calibrated for easy
questions. This became known as the hard/easy effect (e.g. Lichtenstein and
Fischhoff 1977). However, Juslin et al. (2000) recently conducted a meta-analysis of
seventeen previous studies and found that the hard/easy effect is nearly eliminated
when a researcher carefully controls for the scale-end effects (the upper and the
lower bound on confidence scores) and linear dependency.
Gigerenzer et al. (1991) argue that subjects appear overconfident because an
experimenter often selects non-representative general knowledge questions for
which commonly used cues are not particularly useful. Gigerenzer et al. (1991)
find that observed overconfidence is significantly reduced if a representative set of
general knowledge questions is used in the experiment. This finding was replicated
in several other studies (e.g. Juslin 1994; Winman 1997).
However, Griffin and Tversky (1992) and Suantak et al. (1996) argue that a
representative set of general knowledge questions is often too easy for subjects and
they reveal underconfidence due to the hard/easy effect. Juslin et al. (2000)
conducted a meta-analysis of 95 studies with non-representative general knowledge
questions and 35 studies with representative general knowledge questions. Juslin et
al. (2000) found that the overconfidence phenomenon is less pronounced in the latter
studies even after controlling for the difficulty level of both samples.
People often appear overconfident for questions where they possess a self-
declared expertise (Heath and Tversky 1991) but their overconfidence decreases for
questions where they find themselves incompetent (Kruger 1999). Erev et al. (1994)
argue that different research methods can generate both an apparent over confidence
and an apparent underconfidence from the same data, if we allow for the possibility
that true judgments are perturbed by random errors. Soll (1996) points to a
considerable heterogeneity in the individual data—some people appear to be
systematically overconfident whereas others are biased to underconfidence.
Psychological studies of confidence in own knowledge typically do not provide
financial incentives for revealing subjective confidence in an experiment. In contrast,
economic literature on overconfidence usually employs monetary payoffs. Camerer
and Lovallo (1999) find strong evidence of overconfidence in an experimental
market entry game. Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) observe overconfidence
according to subjective judgments but not according to revealed choices in an
experimental asset market. Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) find that overconfidence
changes to underconfidence when an experimental task becomes less familiar and
this effect is stronger with monetary incentives.
However, these economic papers do not measure confidence in own knowledge.
They document an above average effect—people perceive themselves more
favorably than they perceive the average member of their reference group. The
above average effect does not necessarily indicate that people overestimate their
group ranking in terms of general knowledge, ability, etc. Such apparent
overconfidence may also reflect a subjective belief that the distribution of general
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knowledge, ability, etc. is highly skewed in the relevant reference group (related
discussion is in Viscusi and Zeckhauser 2006; Krajc and Ortmann 2008).
When it comes to the measurement of confidence in own knowledge with
monetary incentives, the most popular method is arguably an elicitation of
confidence intervals (e.g. Russo and Schoemaker 1992). In a typical setting, subjects
are asked to reveal a lower and upper bound for the n-percent confidence interval of
a correct answer to a general knowledge question. Subjects are classified as
overconfident if a correct answer falls into the stated interval in less than n-percent
of cases. Using this method, Cesarini et al. (2006) observe that overconfidence is
reduced by about 65% when monetary incentives and a frequency rather than a
probability assessment are introduced. However, the confidence interval elicitation
method is not incentive-compatible because subjects can deliberately misrepresent
their confidence intervals (as explained in detail in the next section).
This paper presents a new incentive-compatible method for measuring individual
confidence in own knowledge and/or ability. In the proposed method, overconfi-
dence is tested by means of a simple (non-strategic) choice problem. Subjects
receive an opportunity to bet either on their own knowledge and/or ability or on an
equivalent lottery. Subjects who decide to bet on own knowledge and/or ability are
classified as overconfident and subjects who decide to bet on the risky gamble—as
underconfident. Unlike other methods of measuring individual confidence, such as
the estimation of confidence intervals, our proposed method is incentive-compatible.
Subjects cannot increase their monetary payoffs through deliberate misreporting of
their confidence assessment, through conscious incorrect answering or through
strategically chosen low effort.
The paper also presents the results of an experiment, where the proposed method
is used for measuring individual confidence in general knowledge trivia.
Experimental results show that subjects, on average, exhibit underconfidence about
their own knowledge when the incentive compatible mechanism is used. Their
subjective confidence does not depend on their risk/ambiguity aversion or seeking
i.e. our proposed measure of confidence in own knowledge is not confounded with
individual risk attitudes or attitudes towards ambiguity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes a new
incentive-compatible method for measuring individual confidence in own knowl-
edge. Section 2 presents the design and implementation of the experiment. Section 3
presents the experimental results. Section 4 concludes.
1 Method
As we already mentioned in the introduction, a popular method for measuring
individual confidence is an elicitation of confidence intervals. In a typical setting,
subjects are asked to reveal a lower and upper bound for the n-percent confidence
interval of a correct answer to a general knowledge question, a future price in the
experimental market, a ranking of their ability level etc. Subjects are classified as
overconfident if a variable of interest falls into the stated interval in less than n-
percent of cases. Experimental papers in psychology typically do not provide
monetary incentives for reporting confidence intervals.
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Experimental papers in economics usually offer a small reward to subjects if a
variable of interest falls into the revealed confidence interval with the stated
frequency. For instance, Cesarini et al. (2006) ask subjects to provide a 90%
confidence interval for numerical answers to ten general knowledge questions.
Subjects are then asked to assess if the correct answers indeed fall into the stated
intervals and they are awarded approximately US $6 for each correct assessment.
Despite the popularity of the method, elicitation of confidence intervals is not
incentive-compatible. If subjects are not informed about the exact mechanism how
they earn money before they state their confidence intervals, there is no financial
incentive for revealing subjective confidence intervals.1 If subjects are informed
about their payoff function at the beginning of an experiment, they can increase their
monetary payoff if they deliberately misrepresent their confidence intervals. For
instance, Cesarini et al. (2006) report that one subject anticipated subsequent
development of the experiment and strategically misreported his stated confidence
intervals—for nine questions this student reported extremely wide confidence
intervals and for one question he made a point estimate (so that nine out of ten of
correct answers would fall into the stated 90% confidence intervals with relative
certainty).
To avoid such problems associated with payoffs contingent on the realization of a
variable of interest inside the stated confidence intervals, we propose a new method
for measuring individual confidence. The proposed method consists of two parts. In
the first part, a subject is asked to answer N>1 general knowledge questions or to
contribute his or her effort in N tasks, where success depends on individual ability.
The subject is informed that the more questions he or she answers correctly (the
more tasks he or she completes successfully), the higher are the chances of getting a
fixed monetary payoff M.
In the second part, the subject faces a choice between the following alternatives:
1. One of N questions (tasks) is selected at random and the subject receives a fixed
monetary payoff M if his or her answer to the selected question was correct (the
selected task was completed successfully);
2. The subject plays a risky lottery that yields a fixed monetary payoff M with
probability n/N, where n is calculated as the number of correctly answered
questions (the number of tasks completed successfully) in the first part;
3. Either alternative 1 or alternative 2 is selected at random.
Alternatives 1–3 yield identical distributions of monetary outcomes. Thus, a well-
calibrated subject is indifferent between all three alternatives. However, an
individual who is overconfident about own knowledge and/or ability would prefer
alternative 1 and an individual who is underconfident would opt for alternative 2.
Thus, we have a simple measure of individual confidence in own knowledge through
a revealed choice.
1 In this case, subjects state confidence intervals without any knowledge whether too wide or too narrow
intervals will increase or decrease their monetary payoffs. Since subjects do not know how their choice of
confidence intervals affects future monetary payoffs, they do not have financial incentives for revealing
true confidence intervals.
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Notice that the proposed method is incentive-compatible because subjects cannot
increase their payoff if they deliberately provide incorrect answers to some of the
general knowledge questions or if they strategically contribute a lower effort in some
of the tasks. In such cases subjects still face a choice among identical probability
distributions at the second part of the experiment (although with less favorable
odds). As long as individual preferences satisfy first-order stochastic dominance,
subjects cannot gain from giving deliberately incorrect answers (or strategically
lower effort). Thus, our method avoids the incentive problems associated with the
elicitation of confidence intervals.
However, one can argue that the proposed measure of individual confidence in
own knowledge might be confounded with individual risk aversion and/or ambiguity
aversion. At the second part of the experiment, individuals are confronted with a
choice between an ambiguous lottery (alternative 1) and a risky lottery (alternative
2). Thus, risk and ambiguity attitudes may affect the observed choices. To
investigate this possibility, we run a controlled laboratory experiment, where we
measure individual confidence according to the proposed method as well as
individual risk aversion and ambiguity aversion. We find that observed subjective
confidence does not depend on risk/ambiguity aversion or seeking.
2 Experiment
The experiment is designed to test individual confidence in own knowledge without
self-assessment relative to the reference group because an individual may have little
or no information about abilities of other subjects. Individual confidence is measured
in a simple decision problem. Initially, subjects receive ten general knowledge
questions, each with five possible answers (e.g. Table 1). Subjects are informed that
the more questions they answer correctly, the higher is their potential payoff. Having
answered all questions, subjects face a choice among three alternatives:
1. One of ten questions is selected at random and the subject receives 50 CHF (US
$∼39) if he or she answered this question correctly and 1 CHF (US $∼1.28) if
his or her answer was incorrect;
2. One card is randomly drawn from a box with ten cards numbered from 1 to 10
and the subject receives 50 CHF when the number on the drawn card is smaller
Table 1 Multiple-choice general knowledge questions used in the experiment (with correct answers in
italic type)
1. Earth equator is around … 000 km long 40 24 36 52 14
2. Solar system consists of… known planets. 13 8 12 9 17
3. First Tour de France took place in year … 1898 1915 1903 1814 1938
4. Which triple of notes contains C major? A-C-B D-F-A C-D-G F-C-D C-E-G
5. Ludwig van Beethoven wrote… symphonies 15 9 41 13 104
6. Electric frequency in central Europe is … Hz 220 110 50 66 85
7. Human cell consists of… chromosomes. 32 58 46 38 23
8. Human body has… sense organs. 4 5 6 7 8
9. Sum of angles in a triangle is … degrees 360 380 60 90 180
10. “Lord of the Rings” is based on a book by… Tolkien Tolstoy Trotzki Thomas Trevier
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than or equal to n (1 CHF otherwise). n is calculated as a number of questions
that the subject answered correctly2;
3. Either alternative 1 or alternative 2 is selected (the subject presses button “Both
alternatives are the same”).
Alternatives 1–3 yield identical distribution of monetary outcomes but subjects
are not aware of this fact. Subjects are classified as overconfident (i.e. overestimating
own knowledge) if they select alternative 1, as underconfident (i.e. underestimating
own knowledge)—if they select alternative 2, and well calibrated—if they select
alternative 3. Notice that alternative 1 involves an ambiguous lottery (betting on an
uncertain event) and alternative 2 involves a risky lottery (betting on an event with a
known probability). Thus, ambiguity averse subjects may be inclined to choose
alternative 2 and risk averse subjects may prefer alternative 1. To control for risk
attitudes we measured risk aversion and ambiguity aversion of every subject.
The Holt and Laury (2002) method is used for measuring individual risk aversion.
A subject is faced with nine lottery pairs fSi ,Rig, i 2 f1,…, 9g. A safer lottery Si
yields 20 CHF with probability i/10 and 16 CHF otherwise. A riskier lottery Ri
yields 40 CHF with probability i/10 and 1 CHF otherwise. In each of nine lottery
pairs a subject can choose either a safer lottery, or a riskier lottery, or can declare
indifference (in this case lottery is selected at random). A risk neutral expected utility
maximizer chooses lottery Si when i≤4 and lottery Ri—when i≥5. A risk seeking
individual switches from Si to Ri when i≤3 and a risk averse individual—when i≥5.
A similar method is used for measuring individual attitudes towards ambiguity. A
subject is confronted with nine lottery pairs fUj ,Ag, j 2f1,…, 9g. An unambiguous
lottery Uj delivers 50 CHF with probability j/10 and 1 CHF otherwise. An
ambiguous lottery A delivers either 50 CHF or 1 CHF with unknown probabilities. A
subject is classified as ambiguity neutral if he or she chooses lottery Awhen j<5 and
lottery Uj—when j>6. A subject is classified as ambiguity averse if he or she
switches from A to Uj when j≤4. A subject is classified as ambiguity seeking if the
switch occurs when j≥6.
All 18 lottery pairs that are used for eliciting individual risk attitudes are
presented to subjects in a random order. At the end of the experiment one of the
problems is selected at random and subjects receive their payoffs according to their
choices in the selected problem (a random lottery incentive scheme). The realization
of all random events is performed by subjects themselves, who draw a standard
bridge card from a box with a specified distribution of cards inside.
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (e.g. Fischbacher 2007) and
conducted in the IEW experimental lab in Zurich. Forty eight undergraduate
students of the University of Zurich (24 male and 24 female) participated in three
experimental sessions on December 16 and December 20, 2005. On average, the
experiment lasted 45 min and average earnings, including a 5 CHF show-up fee,
were 30.50 CHF (median earnings were 23 CHF). A translation of the experimental
instructions is given in the “Appendix”.
2 Although subjects see the number n, they are not informed that this is exactly the number of their correct
answers.
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3 Results
Thirty-one out of forty-eight subjects (65%) are classified as underconfident, 14
(29%)—as overconfident and only three subjects (6%)—as well calibrated. Figure 1
shows that individuals with poor general knowledge (one to five correct answers)
and good general knowledge (eight to nine correct answers) appear to be
predominantly underconfident. Among those subjects who gave one to five correct
answers, the proportion of underconfident subjects is significantly higher than 50%
(χ2 test 8.33, p=0.004). Only individuals with average general knowledge (who
answered six to seven questions correctly) exhibit both under- and overconfidence in
similar proportions.
Figure 2 shows how individual confidence is related to risk aversion/seeking. The
horizontal axis allows to differentiate between underconfident, well calibrated and
overconfident subjects. The vertical axis shows the number i 2 f1,…, 9g of a lottery
pair in which a subject switches from a safer lottery Si to a riskier lottery Ri in the
Holt and Laury (2002) procedure. Recall that subjects face decision problems in a
random order and, therefore, they are not restricted to select a unique switching point.
Only twenty six subjects (54%) in our experiment have a unique switching point. For
the remaining subjects, Fig. 2 shows a vertical line that connects the highest number
i 2 1; :::; 9f g such that a subject always chooses lottery Si when i  i and the lowest
number i 2 1; . . . ; 9f g such that the subject always chooses lottery Ri when i > i.
Figure 2 shows that the level of confidence is not correlated with risk attitudes.
Among underconfident subjects, 52% are risk averse, 6%—risk neutral and 10%—
risk seeking (the remaining subjects cannot be classified). Among overconfident
subjects, 64% are risk averse, 7%—risk neutral and 14%—risk seeking. Overcon-
fident subjects are not significantly more risk averse than underconfident subjects (p-
value for Fisher’s exact probability test is 0.6192).
Figure 3 shows that individual confidence is also not correlated with ambiguity
aversion or seeking. Thirty-five percent of underconfident subjects are ambiguity
averse, 10%—ambiguity neutral and 3%—ambiguity seeking. Forty-three percent of
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overconfident subjects are ambiguity averse, 29%—ambiguity neutral and 7%—
ambiguity seeking. Obviously, underconfident subjects do not appear to be more
ambiguity averse than overconfident subjects. Thus, we can conclude that a high
level of underconfidence observed in our experiment is not due to ambiguity
aversion or risk seeking.
Experimental results clearly demonstrate that our proposed measure of individual
confidence in own knowledge is not affected by individual attitudes towards risk or
ambiguity. Experimental results also show that subjects appear to be predominantly
underconfident about their own knowledge, when a new incentive compatible
method is used. This is consistent with recent findings of Hoelzl and Rustichini
(2005) and Cesarini et al. (2006) that monetary incentives tend to reduce the
overconfidence bias.
4 Conclusion
Subjective confidence in own knowledge and/or ability is typically tested through
the elicitation of confidence intervals. Unfortunately, this procedure is not incentive-
compatible. This paper proposed a new incentive-compatible measure of individual
confidence in own knowledge. Individual confidence is measured in a simple
decision problem where subjects bet either on own knowledge/ability (which reveals
overconfidence) or on an equivalent risky lottery (which signals underconfidence).
The proposed measure is robust to possible strategic behavior of subjects, when they
deliberately provide incorrect answers or contribute low effort. The results of a
laboratory experiment show that the new measure of confidence in own knowledge
is not confounded with individual attitudes towards risk or ambiguity.
Experimental results also show that individuals are predominantly underconfident.
This conclusion does not depend on whether subjects have poor or good general
knowledge, and whether they are risk/ambiguity averse or seeking. Our findings
support the conclusion of Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) and Cesarini et al. (2006) that
monetary incentives tend to reduce (and even reverse) the overconfidence bias. Our
results also suggest that this bias may be found in strategic games (e.g. Camerer and
Lovallo 1999) because subjects receive little (or no) information about their
counterparts, and not because they have excessive confidence in own ability.
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Appendix
Experimental instructions
Dear participant,
You are about to participate in the experiment on individual decision making. The
experiment will last about 1 h. Your payoff will depend only on your decisions and
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the realization of random events (it will not be affected by the decisions of other
participants in the room).
You will be given 19 problems and in each problem you need to choose “Left
option”, “Right option” or “Both alternatives are the same”. If you choose “Both
alternatives are the same”, a computer will select either “Left option” or “Right
option” at random. The problems will appear one by one on your computer screen.
The example of a typical problem is given below:
Problem 5
Box I  contains: 
5 red cards 
5 black cards 
Box J  contains: 
5 blue cards 
5 yellow cards 
One card is drawn from the box. 
You receive  20 CHF if this card is  red  40 CHF if this card is blue 
16 CHF if this card is  black  1 CHF if this card is yellow
 
 
Left option 
 
 
Both alternatives are 
the same 
 
 
Right option 
 
Card is drawn from Box I  Card is drawn either from Box I or from Box J  
Card is drawn from Box 
J
 
Your payoff is determined at the end of the experiment (when all participants
answered all 19 questions). We will give one of the participants a box that contains
cards numbered from 1 to 19. The participant will draw one card from this box. The
number on this card will determine one of 19 problems. This problem (together with
your choice) will reappear on your computer screen. Then another contestant (it
could be you!) will draw a card from the box THAT YOU HAVE CHOSEN in this
problem. The color of this card will determine your payoff.
For example, suppose that the first drawn card has number 5 and problem 5
presented above reappears on your screen. And suppose that you have chosen “Right
option” in this problem. Then one of the contestants will be asked to draw one card
from Box J. If this card is blue, your payoff in the experiment is 40 CHF. If this card
is yellow, your payoff in the experiment is 1 CHF.
Your payoff will be paid out in cash at the end of the experiment. All boxes used
in the experiment are available for inspection after the experiment. If you have any
further questions, please ask them now.
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